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I !IL •:/\SE 
111, rnber s of the Vernal City 
!'" ,,J t,::i bring a defamation 
I'' '[It; LfJWER COIJHT 
,,_,dgmcnt in the Urstricl Court. 
'•! Lt S<jlJGl!T ON APPEAL 
•I ,,1., I•, ci,. judgment uf th" lower Courc sus-
I I I I) l j r I J cj 
/!it 'It l. Cl t l!• 
(l ''-'' ,, 
< Ju L 
ll'--
ts of the Vernal City Police Depart-
office arrested Carol Newm:m 
1suant to a lawfully issued War-
,l,:--, :u 11c tu lle-r ai"1·est, made var1ous pub-
Lie Jr1.:;; "--'' 11ccr1 1 n'-J uff1c1_L-s' rniscunduct during the arrest. 
Lctkc' !'I t lnJ' 
\'-.:- JlJi > '-I 
-.le l :--: Lr1,i 1 
lJ·, ( ll 1 , ..__ 1 I l l ·-' 
j I 
I" 
five officers attempted 
News and the Salt 
,j 1 l ,· 1 Ii'-::) L_ h_, Jl L'c:St. accusations involved 
1 uffic_:_al invt.·stllJrill.OL was commenced by the 
,,.,,:irt111•1nt and, at thco reyucost of Vernal City, 
,,d;,t \' :-::.11,,_'.r iff 's Uepartment. Neither investigation 
J,f »f lJ"f" act1un by the arresting officers. 
'.!• 'I[ '-I_[ Ll 
anJ the wide distribution of the state-
t.licc 1110.' ale in the Vernal City Police 
The relationship between thL 
,, ,_ ... , L Jll>I the publir alsu deteriorate-'! and 
"ust and .n the officers. 
'.1 lJ:d1catl2d Nc\vman's 111tent tc sue Ver-
'«! cclth Jes attornecy 0na the attorney 
_ic' l'.Jn, the Vv1nuj _'..:.Ly ·...:uuncil deter-
mined that the best 1ntc·rc:st .·, ,,1 : 11. 1 t, W'•iild be SI I ved by bl 111y-
ing legal action. SuLSl'qlll_-11t t,1 11111 Lime, .J. dCtluri 
brought in behalf of Ve! 11.Jl llj' '-111d tllt::'. offlC\....'lS lilVOlVL!J. v. r11al 
City paid attorney's 0t 111 connect1un with th'" law-
suit. Mayor Samuel Snyder, Li:; f\JJ1dc1v1t tiled in this mattir, 1nd1· 
cated that the filiny of the ctct1on 1ncreaserl the morale of 
nal City Police Department. 
ARGUMENT 
POI :'T ON!:: 
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF THE OPEN MEETING 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AS CONTAINED IN 'l'I'l'LE 52, CHAPTER 4, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED) CONCERNING CLOSED PUBLIC MEETING: 
Appellants in their make several allegations that the 
Vernal City Council violated the prov1s1ons of Title 52, Chapter 4, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). In making such claims, Ap-
pellants rely on the Defendants' Answ1·rs to Plaintiff's First 
Interrogatories wherein it was stated that the Vernal City Council 
met in executive session on December 23, 1980, to discuss the 
against Carol Newman, (at pages l and 2) Although the Council in-
dicated its support for the police officers involved, no formal ac-
t1on was taken by the Council at that time, (page 2). Subs.,.qut>nt 
to that time, on February 5, 1981, a contract between attorney Lynn 
Lund and Vernal City was executed, (page 3). It is purs, int to 
the February 5th contract that the $1,875.00 in question was distr1 
buted, (at pages 2 and 3). 
Appellants only complaint concerning the December 23rd meet-
ing is that the meeting was closed to the public. Appellants have 
ignored the provisions of Title 52, Chapter 4, Section 5 (1) (b) 
which provides that "A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Sec-
tion 52-4-4 for any of +'c, l luw1 r•q pur1,.,ses: ... (b) Strategy ses-
sions with respecl tu c-<Jll,_cL1v1e barqa1r11n<J, litigation, or pur-
chase of real prop"rty; ... " Utah law lil<clL'f.,r•_· specif1cally aLluws 
a public entity to meet in to cons1dt-!r ccni-
-2-
t " t n <J 1 it i g at ion . /\ clusL'd meeting of the Vernal City Council 
''""'"deer the· c1dv1sab111ty of bringing ltegal action is therefore 
·t· dl ly nut ttt v1ulatiun of the uµen meeting laws of the State of 
even assuming a violation of the open meeting 
Jaws uf this State, the Apµellants have failed to plead such vio-
Jations in their Comµlaint. 
v1J•.eS that: 
Title 52, Chapter 4, Section 8 pro-
"Any final action taken in violation of Sec-
tion 52-4-3 and 52-4-6 is voidable by a Court 
uf competent jurisdiction. Suit to void final 
action shall be commenced within 90 days after 
the action except that with respect to any 
final action concerning the issuance of bonds, 
notes, or other evidences of indebtedness 
suit shall be commenced within 30 days after 
tile action." 
The foregoing mandates that suit be brought to compel com-
pliance or enjoined violations of the open meeting laws within 
r11nety (90) days. In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs have failed 
to make any allegations concerning a violation of Title 52, Chap-
lccl 4. In fact, the Complaint fails to allege or complain about 
any uecision made at a closed meeting. Since more than ninety 
190) days has passed, the Appellants are barred from bringing any 
act LJtl concerning the violation of the open meeting laws of this 
POINT TWO 
i,ilS C:IJT lJ/1U F1\ l'l'H, PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE IMMUNE FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY 
Wlll:l<C: /\c:TlNG WI'l'HIN THE UISCRE'I'IONARY FUNCTION OF THEIR OFFICE: 
linck1 Ll1L laws of the State of Utah, a municipality has the 
11••\v't_J c1r1u can be sued. 
1 The decision of whether or not to 
J,, 1 "•I J, •1c1 I ac.·t tun concerning an issue is a matter of judgment 
111111. tll• d1sc1,·tiunary function of the City Council. The case law 
-3-
; 'I I 0, L'r 1, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
dll I l• (j) ; J'1tl•· G3, L'hapter 30, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended) 
is unanimous in 111.>1, "Lsc:11t bad faith, publ1c ofl1c1ctls 
are not personally liabl<c wl1,•11 11uk111q clec1si<>ns lhat ah, discr,_·-
tionary in nature. 2 To sull1• ,.,,1_1111· .fficiJ.ls to personal 
liability when they etct 11• ·I" 1 , , 111 111 the performance of the:r 
duties would "dissuade c·Jn1\" 1 1•1 .ind r, spuns1ble µersons fr•Jm ac-
l ''ft-lC'_"".
3 
'l'h l cepting the respo11s1bL1t1c•c, ,it 1•11lJ ic . 11e case aw :n 
the State of Utah un1furmly lhis yt.:al1fied inunun1.ty for 
public officials. (supra at paye 721) 
the Court indicated: 
"The generally recoyn12ed cloctrine of law is that 
public officials protected by a qualif 
ir.munity from suits growing out of the performance 
of lawfully authorized discretionary duties, so 
long as they are acting in good faith and are not 
guilty of any willful or intentional wrongdoing." 
Such a policy is in accord with the interest of justice and 
allows public officials freedom to make important decisions they 
face in discharging the responsibilities of their office without 
fear that they may be held liable for mistakes in judgment. 
In Logan City vs. Allen, (supra) the Plaintiff claimed th.:it 
the Cash County Conunissioners and the State Tax conunissioners 
acted wrongfully and unlawfully in compromising property taxes 
which were due. As in the case at bar, the Plaintiff asserted 
that the individual public off1cc.0rs personally liable. The 
Court in its holding found that the decision of whc.0ther or not 
to accept a reduction in the amount of taxes was within the dis-
cretionary functinn of the officers and therefore found that the 
public officials could not be held liable. 
Court observed at page 1089 that: 
_!: n do 1 ny so, the 
"Whethi:,r or net the Tax Cumnnss1oners wei:e correct 
in their analysis of th1s Cuuct's decision or in 
reaching the conclusion they did is of no moment 
hcoLe. It is apparent to us the· Board of L'onunis-
-4-
2
salt Lake LOlllltf v c,llllt<;l1, ll/ D 39 Utah 462 (Utah 1911); 
Board of t>J_t'J)u-_s_<l_1c:cJ! \1i,_;tr1clv. Jt'P.!:'_s_on, 220 P. 106). 
74 Utah 576 (Ut.:ih 1929); 1<Y)Cill •'111 v. 1,11.ri, 44 !'.2d 108'), 86 Ulaf 
(Utah 1935); Z'-.nderson 11. G1.;1;i1, :;1/1•JUl--Uist:1ct, 413 P.2d 'J97, 17 
Utah 2d 405 (Utahl96{)'; Utah State- lll;lVL'fSll\;- V. Sutro Cz,.' L'l 
- -- -- - - - -- - - ----- - - -- - -
646 P. 2d 715 (Utah 1982); l'cl_£_b_'>: _.-_·ounty v ._ 160 P. 7r-,5, ' 
Utah 503 (Utah 1916). 
3Anderson v. Granite School U_l (Su;. rd u t P. S99) . 
-. I 
' l t l 
·; 1"n"1 s d11J Uk State: Tax Commission acted in 
1 Ii·· 11 I"'' .:;t quud fa1 lh, and ir1 the belief the 
s· t' I· lll• fll ,.ffc"ct.,d Wils for the best interest 
t!1· StdL1-·, LrJunty, and the City. 11 
"I" 1,-, ltk 1ssue in this case is not whether the City 
1111,i1 ri .1 Jefum<J.t1on action. The issue is whether the 
1 .1 Is .tclced 1 n qoocl faith in filing the action and in 
.1 ·L11 •l 1L111·J 1 .. ;ymc-nt fur attorney fcoc:s in connection with the 
c11·t 'Ult. !11 lh1s regard, it should be noted that in reviewing legis-
ldt iv,· ucL.'., the: Courts have accorded public officials the pre-
·'limpt 1u11 cit yuoJ fa1th.
4 
'I'll< Vernal City council was faced with a difficult situa-
L 1111 wncon it m<lde its decision to bring a defamation action. A 
c 1 t 1 z, n had cha1·gced that a police officer had attempted to rape 
llvl wl11 lcc the> officer was pc:rforming his official duties. Simi-
l<ll uf 1mproper and unlawful acts on the part of the 
,,ff1cvr:o (sexual assault) had reCc>lVed wide circulation through 
The morale of the police officers and the public 
ti·ust and cunf idence in its police department had both suffered 
c1:0 a 1 c-sttl t uf the charges. After receiving a report by the 
'.ia. l t l,ake L:uunty Sheri ff' s Office which showed that there was no 
··v1d1'11<> t0 ,;uppurt the charges and after consulting with two 
.1 t t urn«·;s, the- City Council decid"d to bring a defamation ac-
t1"n 1rn behalf of the City. It is clear that in doing so the 
"1Ly -·uncll was both attempting to improve the morale of its of-
1.:.-r s and was attemµting to restore public confidence in the of-
t 1· ·rs by l•1rcing a µubl1c resolution of the matter through the 
'"·· u r l . Tlk 1 ,. have be con no allegations that the individual Coun-
c 1 l 111, mbcc1 s wuulJ personally benefit from the bringing of the ac-
t t Ll1cil tl11Cy otherwise acted in bad faith. The only allegations 
111-11 ll1" clc-c1s1on to litigate was imµroperly made at a closed 
.11.d that the Jecision benefited private individuals (the 
-5-
ll«cttd "f Education of Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 
officers) rather than th" 'J•t1<·1al public. 
legations of Appellants' Cumplc11nl, it is clear that tht: C1ly 
Council acted in good faith w1 th LI\ lll<' Jiscretionary functior1 ol 
their offices. The reef or'", und. 1 t lie cases above cited, they 
are immune from persona I 11clb1 11 ty. '-' 
PULN'l' THREE 
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT ALLEGED '1'1!1\'l' '!'HE /\CTION COMPLAINED OF W1\S 'l'AKEh 
IN BAD FAITH OR WAS A RESUL'l' UF FIU\UIJ Ok COE!<UPTION: 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of c1v1l Procedure state: "In 
all averments of fraud or nnstake, lhe circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." This require-
ment has two purposes: (l) It protects the Defendant from lightly 
made public claims or accusations, and (2) It provides a Defendant 
an opportunity to understand what conduct is complained of, in or-
der to prepare his defense. 6 Since fraud must be particularly 
plead, the general rule that pleadings should be liberally construec 
does not apply to allegations of fraud. 7 Moreover, when consider-
ing acts of public officers within their public duties, good faith 
presumed. 8 
In their Complaint, the Appellants have not alleged acts that 
were in bad faith, or which were fraudulent or corrupt. In Appel-
lants' argument, he has argued that his Complaint, "point categori-
cally to something bordering on fraud or deceit" or "implies some-
thing almost identical to fraud" or "borders on fraud" or was 
"shady". Neither those allegations nor the allegations in the Com-
plaint meet the requirements of particularity as required under our 
rules for pleading. The general allegation that the acts of the 
Council were without authority or were unlawful similarly do not 
meet the requirements of Rule 9(b). 
Defects which may make the distribution of funds unauthorized 
and unlawful range from merely inn"cenlly failing to follow propc"r 
procedures to outright theft. !111 al of an unlawful and 
unauthorized d1str1butJ.on ut fu11ds """'° nut necessarily imply bad 
-- r,-
5sa_l: t (SuJ,,<1) 
6
Rich v. Touche Ross and f, 8 F. l<. u. 24 3 ( l '!7 5) . 
7
Rosenthal k ______ v. Per .ins, 257 S.E.2d 63 (N<itth Carolina 1979). 
8
sears v. Board "f Educattun ut U•Jc_J, 11 ly, (Supra) . 
faith ur frauduleent ccts. Because fraud is never presumed, the 
mere fact that may have intended to plead fraud will not cure 
•he defect of failing to pl'"ad fraud with particularity. 9 Plead-
111qs suc:h c:s the pleadings involved in this case which merely al-
action without setting forth the facts relied upon 
nave not been upheld cs meeting the requirements of particularity. 10 
POINT FOUR 
1\PPELLANTS' UISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS IN THIS CASE WAS A LEGAL DISTRI-
BUTION OF FUNDS FOR AN AUTHORIZED PUBLIC PURPOSE: 
The central issue of this case is the determination as to 
whether the monies were expended for an authorized public purpose. 
Although not required by any specific clause of our Constitution, 
it is a well established constitutional tenet that public funds 
can only be expended for public purpose. 11 The well recognized test 
in determining whether a particular expenditure is for a public pur-
pose is whether the expenditure confers a benefit of a reasonably 
general character upon the public. 12 What constitutes a public pur-
pose cannot be precisely defined. Therefore:, to a considerable ex-
tent each case must be decided upon its own facts, 13 keeping in 
14 . l d f h . 15 mind the changing developmentc and socia nee s o t e times. 
Furthermore, when a public purpose exists, the power of the Legis-
lature to act will not be curtailed or destroyed merely because some 
private may be benefited. 16 
In this case, it is important to note that, in the judgment of 
Lhe Vernal City Council, the public trust and confidence had serious-
J bc:en damaged by Newman's claims that the police officers hcd 
1 .:ped her. Also, Newman and her attorneys had indicated 
-7-
\"u1•vr v. Lccsl1e Salt Co., 451 P.2d 406 (Calif. 1969). 
I II - - ------- -------
k,,c;e11t hal v. Perkins, (Supra). 
----
j 
1u''"i'"' v. city of Madiso:'., 256 N.W.2d 139 (Wisc. 1977). 
') 
'1 '"""' ,,f the Justices, 208 N.E.2d 823 (Mass. 1965). 
-------
['fl,,, 1,,,,_ v. c_1_LY_:?f Kalamazas, 264 N.W.2d 128 (Mich. 1978). 
I 194 P.2d 435 (Ariz. 1948). 
•11.11 1•11• '.-;cervices, Inc. v. Board c;f Adjustment, 119 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1956) · 
-
[._ Stttut ,.,J. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978); 
'1,,, 1.1,, v. c:ify -of-Ph1Ta-cieTpnia, 176 A.2d 697 (Pa. 1962); Opinion 
,,f Ll1.- ,Just1ccc-s;-Ts-uµrc). -----
that they ir:tended to brcng h'gal d1:t '"'' 
All of th1 s he>d , J111l' 111 ii 
''),I l 110;l Vernal C1 ty clt1d 
I" ctffecl lhe fJOllC•' off l its cfficers. 
cers' morale. It was L11c I';, 1ud'J'"""t that th1· ctclual fcJcts 
sho'..!ld be brought beforce thc.e putl1c illld thdl lhco individual of:'1-
cers should be compensated fo1 th:: da.<,dcws Llky had t:eceived while' 
dischar3ing their official duti"s 
No one can doubt that the City has a interest in 
promoting and encou.raging public confidence in rrnblic 
who administer and enfcrce the law. Under our for:n of goverrtrnent, 
citizens must rely upon the honesty and integrity of their officers 
in enforcing the law. When public tru.st officers decline, re-
spect and obedience to the law must necessarily decline. On a very 
practical citizens are more likely to question and challengt 
law enforcement officials in the performance of their duties if 
they believe that the officers themselves have engaged in unlawful 
conduct. To be effective, the public perception of the officers' 
integrity must be that the officers are above reproach. In this 
case, the Council was legitimately concerned that the public tr'..!st 
and confidence in its police off Lcers wac declining in spite of the 
fact that Lhe officers were innocent of any wrongdoing. Their de-
cision to support the officers through a public trial, wherein the 
main issue would revolve around the various allegations made by 
Mrs. Newm;in, was an attempt to restore public trust and confidenct: 
in its police officers. 
The City Council was also legitimately concerned with the 
morale of its officers. The public allr yations made tm:ard the of-
ficers had been made as a result of the ufficers acting in their 
official duties as police officers. In spite of the investigation 
by the Salt Lake Sheriff's tl1epc1rtment, wtuch showed no evidence of 
improper police act1un, 111oraJ,. c1n1l1nuvd to be luw. Such accusa-
tions die hard, the a11rJ r·rrnu11ui11ty d1scuss1on ln s:...!ch 
is never as great as that affo1 ,j, d Lil• 1111 Lid} ch.:irge. 
-8-
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L•I t0111ly the Council had a legitimate interest in improving the 
(.f its d·-'fJC:ll C.:ummon experience teaches that 
,1 dl•· ll·dcJ..',, tHJl unly Lu i;uor Job but also contr1-
t" III<Jll Lui 11uv<:r ratc:s, and tends to discourage qualified per-
.ii' "''" "'-'c·k1nq and obta1n1ny employment. All of this inevitably 
,1.Js t" ]L'SS .,ffcccl1ve law .cnforcement. The City Council clearly 
d 11ubl 1c interest in encouraging effective law enforcement. In 
111· judgment of lhe Council, the morale of the police officers would 
Lw 1JI ,,at 1 y improved through the Council' s active support of the de-
t JJna l iun suit. The Affidavit of Mayor Snyder indicates that morale 
in fact d1d improve as a result of the City's participation in the 
Lawsuit, thus showing the soundness of the Council's decision. 
Also, in this State, it is common practice to provide public 
employees with such benefits as: paid vacations, increased wages 
tor as an employee, health and accident insurance, retire-
ment plans, and other public employee benefits. In authorizing 
['Ul>lic expenditures for these employee benefits, the elected offi-
cials presiding over the various entities have exercised their 
Jud9me1Jt that the: costs of such employee benefits are offset by 
ben"'fits which inure to the entity through higher morale, 
and thr1;ugh tt1c- ability of the entity to attract and keep employees 
whu and qualified. Certainly all these considera-
t1c;ns act w1tt1 cequal weight in this case and justify the Council 
111 public funds to increase the morale of its officers. 
,,ff ic"'1 s 1n this case had suffered damages to their repu-
tdL '""'' un,,ugh the' malicious allegations of Mrs. Newman. If 
t/1, suffc-red had been physical in nature, the City would 
li<>v,_ b'-'"" 1 c-sponsiblce to compensate the officers for medical ex-
l'' 1ic;L_', dtKI uther costs 1 ncurred by the officers in curing the in-
111[ \' , 'Ile· wu uld quest ion the authority of the City to expend 
J ,111cL u11dvi- Lhose c1 rcumstances. In this case, the officers 
-9-
were just as surely damaged whil·-· d1sd1<1rqing the1r officidl dut1e 5 
It must be remembered that Mr:o. N1·wn1.111 was11 1 L mer»ly sayiny t hdt_ 
the off ice rs weren't nic,., pccu[l [,. "11, l1<1d cl d 1 m"d that th"y had 
attempted to rape her d!ld had ScXIIdl Ly c1ssaulted her. It lS c•asy 
to envision the damage unc· w"u ld su l lt·1 as a r<csul t of such al lL·-
gations. Surely the City car1 act c1f'f1rmdt1vely tu com1•c:nsdt,• lht· 
officers for these damages. Tl1erc·fo1t·, Lhe <expenditure of public 
funds in this case is Justified as an attempt by the C1ty tu com-
pensate its officers for losses suffered in the line of duty. 
Also, in this case, the police officers were acting within th, 
scope of their duties as officers. The City, as th1· officers' cem-
ployer, faced the possibility that Nt'wrnan would bring suit against 
the City. In fact, Newman and her allurneys had indicated that lee 
action would be brought against the City and its officers. Becaus, 
central issues of the defamation suit revolved around the validity 
of Newman's allegations, the C1ty was 1ustified in bringing the 
action in order to reduce the risks of potential liability to the 
The cost to the City in bringing an action locally would be much 
less than the cost of defending an action in another JUrisdict1on 
or before another Court. 
Other in considering similar issues have upheld payment 
for legal as lawful public expenditures. In Cil:Y_ 
vs. Collins, 355 So.2d 1111, the City of Montgomery had contractc:d 
to expend funds for the defense of city police officers who had 
been charged with a crime. Taxpayers brought an action to enjoin 
the payment of the funds. The taxpayers claimed tl1d t it was lJeyunc 
the power of the Cit1 to expend public funds to defend officers 
had committed criminal acts. I11 that case, the Court held that lh 0 
City had a legitimate interest ln th• police: off1c'-'rs. 
The Court noted thc.t becdus1- the cr1m1 nal chi:trcJ'-'S arusce out uf pct· 
forrnance of the iff1c1dJ thP C1Ly was t.:Xpu.svd tn 
- ) l)-
f"·l··11l1<.ll 11ab1l1ty should thee charges prove successful. 
111q, the· Cuurt ubscervc:d: 
In so do-
"Ekcauscc c1 cunsp1racy n11ght µrovide a basis 
fu1· a c1v1l acL1on, and because a municipality 
111<1y l:w mc1d,1 a µarty defendant in such an ac-
L 11 ;11, 1 t w"uld be within the reasonable scope 
uf p1·uper coq.Jurate int<erest for the munici-
[>al 1 ty tu attemµt tu r,rotect itself and its 
uff1cers against future civil litigation brought 
under agc:ncy principles by defending their 
c1gents against criminal charges arising out of 
the same general circumstances with the view 
of obtaining their acquittal ... 
Mureuver, the officers in charge of the adminis-
tration of municipal government might reasonably 
conclude that such action is necessary to the 
good morale of the police department, or for re-
cruitment and retention purposes. Or there may 
exist other equally compelling reasons falling 
within the proper corporate interest." (at pages 
1114 and 1115). 
Under the facts of this case, the expenditures were clearly 
for a legitimate public purposes. 
1rnde1 any or all of the following: 
These expenditures are justified 
(1) As an attempt to improve 
the trust and confidence of the public in those officials who enforce 
th·· law, (2) As an attempt to improve the morale of its employees, 
IJJ As an attempt to assist the officers in receiving compensation 
f,n 1111u11es suffccred in the line of duty, or (4) as an attempt to 
rCJLc.cL 1 ts'-'l t and 1 ts officcers against future civil litigation. 
I 11 t t11s case·, 1 t must be notccd that the Appellants have not ar-
q11c·d thc1t .i 1_'1ly 1s barred frum bringing a defamation action. Basi-
cdll), th, 1:tcf!l1al th1emc· of .Appellants' argument is that such 
have not in the past. Even assuming that 
.u.:h 1s IJ,. eds,, 1t d1h·s not follow that a similar lawsuit will 
··1 ' l.J• ".uc'<'c·ssful 1n Lhc• fulurc>. The· law
17 
and public policy of 
,,, 1.-; thc11 the· L'uurts ar,. upen to all individuals and en-
I I• 1 t Ji i r 1 t t1 i Stat t.._'. Tu huld that it is unlawful to spend 
' "" i 11 ""' .1 pJrlicuLir rc·rnedy because it has not been sue-
-11-
,·t 1uri Ll, Lu11sl1tut 1()!1 of Utah. 
cessful in the past would violat" the: bcL01c· I'' t"D\lSt:S upon wil1ch 
Courts operate and would in effect prevellt Lt1·. •. 1 1d. rly devt:lu[J-
ment of the law. Vernal City is C'llt1tl<'ll tu 11t1qat. before lhe 
Courts of this State the issue of Wht·tllc r "' ""t cI city may be: 
defamed. To hold that the Ctl/ <'uuld 11ul c··>qwr1d public f1rnds lo 
litigate this or any other issue would ,,fl,·ct1vc'1y deny Vccrnal 
City its constitutionally guaranteed access tu the Courts and 
would tend to stagnate the law. The such a hold-
ing upon the orderly development of the case law in this State are 
staggering. 
POINT FIVE 
THE JUDGMENT OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS WILL NOT BE INTERFERED WITH UNLESS 
A REVIEWING COURT CANNOT ENVISION ANY REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN THE EXPENDITURES AND THE INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC: 
The case law is well settled concerning the nature and scope of 
a Court's review of a legislative decision. Basically, the question 
of what is a proper public purpose is a matter fut the Legislature 
to determine. 18 Consideration of whether or not there is a public 
purpose involve economic, social, and political philosophies. 
Such considerations properly should be made by the elected repre-
sentatives of the people. 19 In reviewing the decision of a Legis-
lative body the Couct will not be concerned with the wisdom or 
practicality of Legislative decision.
20 
On review there ls 
a strong presumption that the Legislative acts are proper.
21 
In determining and defining whether an expenditure is pub-
lic, the Court will construe the word "public" broadly so as to 
allow Legislative bodies wide latitude in deciding what may bene-
-12-
18Hooper v. City of Madison, (Supra). 
19
Horton v. City of (Supra) 
20
Hooper v. Madison, (Supt a) ; P .. E_. C_u. t_y _ o_f l 1 s 
(Supra). 
21 R.E. Short Co. v. City of M1nn,,apol1s, (Supra); 1:1ty of 1<os,·v1ilc· 
v. Tulley, 131 P.2d 395--(D.lif-_--1942); <'lly uf v: Wh1tr., 
(Supra); Triangle 011, Inc. v. Nurth Salt ·i;cikt i.',ir·p·o-ra-ti1,-n,- 609 I'. 
1338 (Utah 1980); Tygesen v. 127, 
119 Utah 2d 274 (Utah 1950); -v-. B·o-a1'd uf Educat1un «f (J•Jcle 
city, (Supra); Child v. city 0-rs[,arl1sh--F,Ji-k, -53_8_ P.-id-184 (lltdh 
1975). -- - ---- . 
22 
11 l th•c publ1c, and will presume that the officials acted 
good faith. 24 , J" l l y 
2 3 
i1 nd 1 n 
lhat, where possible, it is the duty of 
,·,,u1 t to con st rue a decision in such a way as to validate the 
·!· <: 1 s1cH1, 
2
') and that it is the burden of the person claiming an 
1nqn•>µr1ety to demonstrate such beyond a reasonable doubt, 26 and 
1 rt"l a decision of the Legislative body should be invalidated only 
when no legitimate public purpose can be conceived. 27 Utah cases 
expressed the above principles as follows: 
,' J 
, I 
"When a municipality acts within the powers given 
it by statute, its acts are not subject to review 
by the Courts unless there is a manifest abuse 
of those powers or unless such right to review is 
granted by statute." Tygesen vs. Magna (Supra) 
at page 132. 
"The Courts may not delve into the wisdom of a 
Legislative act; it is only where there is no 
possible benefit to the public that the Courts 
will review such a Legislative determination." 
S_e<lrs vs. Ogden (Supra) at page 1362. 
" ... the City Council is endowed with broad dis-
cretion to make decisions and determine policies 
which it thinks will best fulfill its responsi-
bilities. Consequently, as in all Legislative 
matters, Courts are relunctant to interfere there-
w1 th; and do so only where the decisions or actions 
taken are clearly outside the authority of the 
governing body, or are so wholly unreasonable and 
unjust that they must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrary in adversely affecting someone's rights." 
Ch1ld vs. City of Spanish Fork (Supra) at page 186. 
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: lo11 v. 1:1 ty of Kalamazas, (Supra) Child v. City of Spanish 
f\_1r-k,- -(S111)ra-1--: 
(Supra) Ii ;-;hrJt ( \). v. ,_. l _t_'/ of M1nneaµolis, 
---
_,, \j . [), 1df d () t Educal1un of Ogden City, (Supra) 
- ------- --- -
II 'I' \j. I l )' uf Madison, (Supra) 
II '[Jt'I ' 1 t '/ (_) f Mad1sun, (Suµra) 
ll"''i"-' v. <'iL1· .. r (Suµra). 
laws of this State were vi" L1 t. J lJ', ind I 1'1 ty. 
record completely void of any LV!d• r1L·,. '" s111•1"11 l thdl ,Jllc·qdl1011, 
but Lhe Appellants themselves ha·rc· failed to alleqcc such a viola-
tion in their Complaint. Si11nla1 ly, thic l\pµ1 lL.int» hav1· whully 
failed to plead bad faith or fraud. 
such matters must be plead with partcularity; the presumption that 
public officials act in good faith; and the rule of law that dbsent 
bad faith public officials are immune from personal liab1l1ty, 
such defect is fatal to the l\ppellanls' case. 
In this case there is ·=v1d1ence that tile City Cuuncil 
acted in pursuing any one of a numbter of l1:g l t ima ti= !JUbl 1 c trnrposcs 
(1) To improve public trust and confidence u1 the offic1"rs, 
(2) To improve the morale of the police office1 s, ( 3) To assist the 
officers in receiving compensation for injuries sufferi=d in 
the line of duty, (4) To pursue its claim of damages fur 
or (5) Tc any risk of putential 11abil1ty to the City. 
Furth<clmvcc:, Appellants have· faih•d tn any facts wtticl1 
would justify the Court in substituting its Judgment for that of 
the City Council's. The facts indicate that there is ample seor!Jort 
for the actions of the Council 111 this case. 
In this case, it is obvious that the City L'ounc1l acted 111 
complete good fa1tl1 and in the. 11i\c1esl uf tl110 ['Ubl1c. 'l'h1..-L t:-f urc', 
Respondents respectfully re .. Juest that the affirm LhL· J'-'c10,i,·. 
of the District Court ,n this case'. 
Respectfully subrniLtced lhis / L 'I a y u f Mu y, l 98 3 . 
I 
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